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Vol VII No 146 28 July 1980


2ist Round of MBFR Talks Concludes in Vienna [WIENER ZEITUNG 25 Jul] a 3 NATO

Luns Views East-West Balance in Europe, French Position [LE MATIN 23 Jul] Cc 1 AUSTRIA

Spanish Foreign Minister Oreja Meets With Pahr [WIENER ZEITUNC 25 Jul] E 1

Pahr Comments on Talks [DIE PRESSE 25 Jul] Departure for Salzburg [DIE PRESSE 26-27 Jul] E 1

ie) ~


FRG, France's Position on Afghanistan Stated

Boelling on Schmidt's Upcoming Talks With Honecker, Gierek Ambassador to Bolivia Recalled; 'Doors Open! to Refugees

FRG Attaches 'Great Significance' to European-Arab Dialogue Terrorists! Planned Attack on Schmidt Reported

DIE WELT: Schmidt Moscow Trip Foils Arms Gap Closure [25 Jul] Poll Shows Schmidt Leading German Election Race [DIE WELT 25 Jul]

Cy Cy Cy Cy Cy Cy Cy COWW DD & eH

FRANCE King Husayn Arrives in Paris on Unofficial Visit i French-Romanian Communique on Ceausescu Visit Cited . = Giseard Sends Condolences to Former Iranian Empress Farah . = Francois-Poncet's Visit to Tanzania Reviewed [LE MONDE 23 Jul] K 1 LE MONDE Sees WEU as Vehicle for FRG Armament, European Defense [23 Jul] K 3 ITALY & THE VATICAN USSR Trade Officials Brezhnev, Osipov Meet Manca on Gas Trade L 1 Brezhnev Meeting on Credits [L'UNITA 23 Jul] » 2 Osipov on Pipeline Project L 1 Parliament Rejects Secrets Charges Agains: Cossiga ~ = PORTUGAL Cabinet-Foreign Ministry Note on Algiers Communique M 1

Romanian Party Delegation Curtails Visit Mil

SPAI overnment Preparing for Negotiations on U.S. Military Pact N 1 reja Says Relations With Israel Not To Be Established Now N 1 PCE's Carrillo Comments on Explosives Theft, NATO ktry N 1 CYPRUS Government Protests to Waldheim Over Turkish Statements R Kiprianou Meets With AKEL Leader; Relationship Unchanged R 1 Diplomatic Relations Established With Suriname R 1 GREECE Mitsotakis States U.S. Bases Will Only Operate Under NATC Ss 1 [I KATHIMERINI 25 Jul] TO VIMA Reports U.S. Denial of Commitment on Aegean Balance [27 Jul] Ss 1 Papandreou Reiterates Opposition to NATO, Bases [EXORMISI 26 Jul] S 2 Briefs: Diplomatic Consultations; Delegation Returns From Cyprus Ss TURKEY

Demirel, Ecevit Hold Meeting With Acting President Caglayangil Statement Demirel Comments Ecevit Statement Photographer Released by Iran Returns to Turkey Iranians Take Back Helicopter; Iranian Worker Defects Demirel Condemns Israeli Decision to Make Jerusalem Capital Demirel Sends Congratulations to New Lebanese Premier

i i i i ee i NNNWAW YY


21ST ROUND OF MBFR TALKS CONCLUDES IN VIENNA AU251420 Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 25 Jul 80 pl [Unattributed report: "Holiday for Forces Reduction Conference"]

[Text] On Thursday at the conclusion of the 2lst round of the Vienna forces reduction conference, NATO and the Warsaw Pact appealed to each other to remove the last ob- stacles in the way of the conclusion of a first partial agreement to provide for a reduction of American and Soviet forces in central Europe. The statements of both sides, however, clearly showed that there are still many problems to be overcome before a breakthrough can be achieved at the negotiations, which have been underway since 1973. The principal point of controversy is the troop strength figures submitted by the two pact systems.

The positions of the sides in the negotiations were outlined at press conferences before the beginning of the 2-nonth summer break by Dutch chief delegate Willem de Vos van Steenwijk and Polish chief delegate Tadeusz Strulak. Ambassador de Vos expressed the view that an agreement on a first reduction phase would now seem within reach if the East were to make concessions in the figures question and to help clear up still- existing discrepancies. The Western representative also called for progress at the discussion on accompanying force reduction measures which, he said, in the eyes of NATO constitute an essential security element. The West is ready to carefully study the new compromise proposal submitted by the East 2 weeks ago, De Vos said. He added, however, that in the West's opinion it is a questionable attempt on the part of the East to now seek to incluje the withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet soldiers from the GDR in the Vienna negotiations when this withdrawal had earlier been declared a unilateral step.

Polish Ambassador Strulak declared that the negotiations had been led out of the cul-de-sac through the latest compromise plan of the Warsaw Pact.

By presenting new figures in January 1980 the East also demonstrated it. readiness to bring about a solution of the figures problem played up by the West. The new Eastern proposals of 10 July, he said, are an “important concession" to the West. They not only provide for Soviet troop withdrawals at a 3-to-] ratio to the American troops, but they have also taken into consideration the Western wish for greater flexibility within the alliances by the concept of fixing maximum national ceilings within the framework of joint pact ceilings.

VII. 28 Jul 80 NATO Cl


[Pascal Krop and Jean-Pierre Mithois undated interview with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns: "France Has Never Really Hoped To Remain a Sanctuary"]

[Text] LE MATIN: Do you believe that we are now seeing an increase in tension in the world?

Joseph LIuns: I believe that frictions reached their highest point at the time of the

invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Since then the USSR has taken no new action which could have increased tension except for the fact that it seems quite determined

not to withdraw from that country.

In the light of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's recent visit to Moscow, I believe that there is a chance~-a small chance--that things could improve by the end of the year, that is, once the alliance adopts a stance.

In any event, the Soviets no longer demand that the decision adopted on 12 December 1979 (LE MATIN note: NATO countries decided on that day to deploy American cruise missiles and Pershing 2 missiles in Europe) be rescinded. It was impossible to achieve this and they have resigned themselves to the inevitable.

LE MATIN: Does this mean that you believe that the atmosphere is improving?

Joseph Luns; The atmosphere is not good. However, it has not deteriorated in recent months, and maybe there is some reason for optimism. I am careful about what I say.

LE MATIN: The Soviets have recently withdrawn 16,000 men from East Germany. Has this conciliatory gesture any significant value?

Joseph Luns: It is of minimal value. We would like to know where these 16,000 men are to go and what kind of troops have been involved. In view of Soviet superiority with respect to troops and conventional arms, this has not greatly altered the situation.

LE MATIN: In your view, have NATO forces been overtaken by Warsaw Pact forces in the sphere of conventional and nuclear forces?

Joseph Luns: It is a fact that in the sphere of conventional forces the Soviets are stronger than we are. However, our defense means are such that we have good reason to believe that any attack launched by the Soviet Union would be stopped.

LE MATIN: Tne deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles in West Europe....

Joseph Luns: Will enable us to rectify the balance and increase the credibility of our deterrent force.

LE MATIN: The United States has been continually complaining of other NATO countries because it believes that they do not devote sufficient efforts to tle defense of the alliance. Do you believe that certain capitals have a tendency toward a certain kind of neutralism?

Joseph luns: This is unrealistic. No NATO country has any tendency toward a certain kind of neutralism. As far as the question of our forces if concerned, it can be said that NATO countries have kept their promises to increase their defense budgets. The Netherlands is doing this. Norway, the FRG, Portugal, France--which is not a member of the integrated command--Greece, Turkey and Great Britain are doing this. There is

some room for doubt as far as Belgium and Denmark are concerned.

LE MATIN: In Detroit, Ronald Reagan has just been chosen by the Republicans as their candidate for the presidency. Do you believe that if he were elected U.S. president, he would play a more or less important role in the defense of the Western world? In the FRG, for instance, people have often complained about a certain softness on the part of President Carter.

VII. 28 Jul 80 Ca2 NATO

Josepi. Luns: In my view, you can no longer talk about American softness. The U.S. defense budget has been increased in an impressive manner by some $25 billion. I have recently noticed what Mr Reagan said about defense and it cannot be ruled out that if he were elected he would contemplate making an ever bigger effort in this sphere.

Much will depend on his choice of department secretaries.

LE MATIN: If Mr Reagan were elected, would his political ideas not clash with the policy of detente which the FRG and France favor?

Joseph Luns: I feel reluctant to express my views on the subject. Fortunately, there often is a lot of difference between what a candidate says at the time of elections and what he does once he is elected.

LE MATIN: The United States and President Carter were obviously annoyed by the recent visits of Helmut Schmidt to Moscow and Giscard d'Estaing to Warsaw.

Joseph Iuns: I must tell you that the Atlantic alliance has not really been annoyed by Mr Schmidt's trip. Mr Schmidt behaved in an exemplary manner--he consulted with his NATO allies, especially the United States.

LE MATIN: Giscard d!'Estaing did not consult with other members of the alliance.

Joseph Luns: Let me tell you that this caused some surprise.

LE MATIN: De you believe that the results achieved were satisfactory?

Joseph Luns: It seems to me that there was more content in Mr Schmidt's talks in Moscow...

LE MATIN: And that he achieved more results? Joseph Luns: Maybe.

IE MATIN: Did General de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO and adopt a policy of national independence harm the Atlantic alliance?

Joseph Luns: I would say that General de Gaulle's decision was understood by some but

not by others and that, generally speaking, countries allied to France would have preferred to see France remain a member of integrated command. Having said this, France's freedom of action in no way depends on whether French forces are or are not integrated in the alliance of which it is a full member. It has liaison missions in every high command,

and cooperation--which is not integration--is satisfactory.

LE MATIN: Hasn't Prance become Atlanticist again since 1974, that is, since the election of Valery Giscard d'Estaing?

Joseph Luns: No, this is an exaggeration. Georges Pompidou when he was president said that it was inconceivable that in the event of any crisis or war France would not be at the side of its allies.

IE MATIN: You expressed great satisfaction with Giscard's press conference on defense.

Joseph Luns: I have been pleased with the fact that France has started considering the possibility of acquiring the neutron bomb, and I said this on my own behalf, not on behalf of NATO. Anything that increases France's military power is welcome and desirable from the allies! viewpoint.

LE MATIN: Insofar as the neutron bomb is a "battleground" weapon, does this decision not appear to be contrary to "“dissuasion" as it was defined until then?

Joseph Luns: This is true, but I have always had some doubts about the "sanctuarization" doctrine. Is it realistic and does it represent France's real position? Since it is a member of the Atlantic alliance, France could not merely remain a sanctuary.

VII. 28 Jul 80 AUSTRIA El


[Summary] Spanish Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja Aguirre arrived in Vienna yesterday, 24 July, for a 2-day official visit, to be followed by an unofficial stay in Salzburg on Saturday and Sunday. Foreign Minister Pahr, om . Oreja at the airport, gave a luncheon for his Spanish guests. Oreja was then received by President Kirchschlaeger, after which he held a l-and-1/2-hour talk with Pahr at the Foreign Ministry. At 1800 Oreja delivered a lecture before the Society for Foreign Policy.

Pahr Comments on Talks AU251143 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 25 Jul 80 p 2

{Excerpt] ‘The talk held yesterday afternoon between Spanish Foreign Minister Oreja and Austrian Foreign Minister Pahr focused on topical international issues and bilateral Questions. As Pahr told DIE PRESSE, the views of the sides are largely identical as far

as the major political problems are concerned. On the Middle East issue, Vienna and Madrid hold nearly identical views. Both sides will continue to pay great attention to

the situation in Latin America. In Pahr's opinion the developments in this region in the coming years will be of great importance for the world situation in general. Pahr stressed that Austria, which has contributed to the best of its ability toward Spain's admission

to the Council of Europe, fully and unreservedly supports Madrid's endeavors to become

é member of the European Communities.

Departure for Salzburg AU280941 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 26-27 Jul 80 p 2 [APA, People's Party press service report: "Oreja Talked in Vienna With Pahr and Mock"]

[Text] Vienna--In discussing international topics at their Vienna talks, Spanish

Foreign Minister Oreja and his Austrian opposite number Pahr paid special attention to preparation of the Madrid CSCE followup conference scheduled for this fall. Pahr outlined the Austrian position that participation of foreign ministers could improve

the prospects of success of that meeting due to the resulting greater pressure of public opinion. He advocated a thorough discussion of the developments in all three "baskets" and outlined the Austrian proposals regarding confidence-building measures for intensified cooperation in the energy sector and regarding working conditions for journalists.

At their second meeting on Friday morning the two ministers discussed the situation in Latin America and in the Middle East. On Friday Oreja also met with Austrian People's Party Chairman Mock, who briefed him on the resolutions of the party leaders conference of the European Democratic Union, of which he is chairman. At the conference, held on

11 July 1980, the leaders of more than 20 European political parties unanimously advocated the expansion of the European Community to include Spain, Portweal and Greece, Mock said.

On Friday afteraoon Oreja and his delegation proceeded by plané=-the same special plane that took them to Vienna--to Salzburg for an unofficial visit, which will end today, Saturday. During his stay in Salzburg, Oreja will, among other things, attend the opening ceremony of the Salzburg Festival.


[Text] Bonn--The Federal Government still considers a political solution of the Afghanistan problem “highly desirable." Speaking at a news conference in Bonn today Government Spokesman Boelling added: "We take the problem of Afghanistan very seriously."

According to Boelling the Federal Government has noted "with regret" that Western suggestions to draw up a timetable for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops have not been taken up by Moscow thus far, The West has made its position clear to the USSR, The federal chancellor made a contribution to this in Moscow, Boelling made the statement in reply to several questions about Bom'!s present position on the Afghanistan question.

According to a statement released by the information service of the French Embassy in

Bonn today, France's attitude is characterized by “firmness and dialogue." France can neither accept the Soviet intervention nor approve of a situation "created by force." Although the world is moving along a dangerous knife edse, the dialogue must be maintained. France will continue to contribute to the search for political solution of the crisis.


[Text] Bonn--At his forthcoming meeting with SED General Secretary Erich Honecker Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt plans to discuss "sensible cooperation between the two German states." In an interview for DPA today Government Spokesman Klaus Boelling out- lined the chancellor's aims and expectations as follows:

"First and foremost it is necessary to discuss a clear outline for sensible cooperation between the two German states and to improve the preconditions for alleviating the hard- ships caused by the division of our country for the citizens here and over there, and for taking advantage of all realistic opportunities to achieve a relationship of good- neighborliness., There is still a lot of work to be done here." [passage indistinct]

The Federal Government does not consider what has been achieved so far in contacts

between people in the two states to be adequate. “We are certain that the vast majority

of all Germans are not prepared to give up the idea that we are one nation, The chancellor's trip is aimed at strengthening the cohesion 0f the Germans at a practical level."

This cannot be achieved through (?unreasonable demands by the opposition) "which are intended to force the GDR to its knees." Efforts should rather be made to achieve further settlements "which directly help to make people's lives easier." Sensible CDU/CSU politicians admit that since the signing of the basic treaty "a tremendous amount has been achieved." [passage indistinct] Boelling said that the Federal Government is assuming that there will be discussions on the crisis-ridden (?international situation), especially on the (?need) for arms limitation and progress in arms control. The two German states have a special responsibility here. "The GDR and the FRG cannot permit themselves the role merely of interested observers," he said.

In Bonn's view the further development of European cooperation will be the dominant topic of the talks between the first secretary of the PZPR, Edward Gierek, and the federal chancellor (?which are planned) to take place about 20 August in Hamburg,



VII, 28 Jul 80

According to Boelling the two politicians will discuss at length “how the military balance in Europe, which has been upset in our view, can be restored and what can be done by

the individual European governments to ccont‘nue the discussion on disarmament measures positively and to reach agreement on additional confidence-building measures, at the

MBFR negotiations in Vienna or at the forthcoming CSCE conference in Madrid, for example.”

In this context Boelling underlined the great expertise and particular commitment of the Polish leadership in questions of arms control policy, which have "al-ays been acknowledged” by the German side, He said that Gierek and Schmidt will discuss these topics "with a precise knowledge of the views of their partners in the two alliances to which they belong."


[Text] Bonn--The Federal Government has recalled its ambassador in La Paz, Johannes von Vacano, to Bonn for a report on events in Bolivia. Foreign Ministry spokesman Juergen Sudhoff told a news conference in Bonn today that the Federal Government wants an exact picture of the situation following the military putsch and to draw the necessary con- clusions on the basis of its analysis.

According to the spokesman the ambassador, who is expected4m Bonn at the beginning of next week, was recalled following intensive consultations with the EC partners. It is not known at the moment whether the other EEC countries will follow the German example.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman emphasized that the German Embassy in La Paz will not turn away persecuted Bolivians. "Our doors are open to refugees," he said, It is not known whether the embassy has already admitted opponents of the regime,

The Federal Government also welcomed Nicaragua's announcement that it intends to play a "very active role" within the Organization of American States in dealing with the RPolivian question, Nicaragua's Foreign Minister Miguel d!'Escoto Brockmann, who has postponed his visit to Bonn because of the coupinBolivia, informed the Federal Government of this in

a letter.

i, spokesman of the Federal]. Development Ministry added that Bolivia wii’. receive no further promises of economic cooperation, Negotiations which had been planned to actualize

recent promises have been suspended. Wor will any more experts be sent to Bolivia. At present 85 experts and development helpers are working in Bolivia, However, Bonn will not stop work on development projects which are of benefit mainly for the population in order "noi to impose additiona) punishment on the people."


LD261100 Hamburg DPA in German 0713 GMT 26 Jul 80

[Excerpts] Bonn--The European-Arab dialogue is to be activated as soon as possible by the EC foreign ministers. This was how Government Spokesman Klaus Boelling outlined the

standpoint of Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on a European contribution to a settlement of the Middle East problems in an interview with DPA today.


Cy \N

VII. 28 Jul 80

From the very beginning the Federal Government has attached great significance to this dialogue, Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi, who was in Bonn this week, the federal chancellor and Foreign Minister Genscher were all of the opinion that this dialogue should be activated as soon as possible amd that a political dimension should be added to it so that possibilities of wide-ranging cooperation--economic, cultural and political--between the two groups of states could be opened up. This could be seen as an example to other groups of states and as a "fundamental contribution" to stability in the Near and Middle East.


{Excerpts ] Hamburg/Stuttgart--Tomorrow's edition of DIE WELT, quoting information from the Federal Criminal Investigation Office (BKA), reports that BKA officials believe there is an “acute danger" of a terrorist attack being planned to murder a political or business leader or security official. Investigations after the fatal accident of alleged terrorists Juliane Plambeck and Wolfgang Beer demonstrated that both had been acting as couriers in connection with a planned assassination,

SPIEGEL magazine in Hamburg reports that security officials possess tangible evidence that preparations were afoot to attack Federal Chanceilor Helmut Schmidt. It says that experts believe that the terrorists are able to strike at only cone leading politician or igh official. Their hard core numbers only about 20 men and women, A Federal

Interior Ministry spokesman refused to "join in speculations about the targets of terror- ists or to reveal relevant information,”

SPIEGEL reports that security experts had concrete indications that terrorists were pre- paring to bomb Federal Chancellor Schmidt. Security officials were confirmed in this theory by evidence found in the Paris apartment of five alleged German women terrorists.

DIE WELT also reported that the BKA believes in the wake of the "aris arrests that the terrorists planned to set a booby trap and try to blow up a passing car by remote control,

DIE WELT: SCHMIDT MOSCOW TRIP FOILS ARMS GAP CLOSURE DW251125 Bonn DIE WELT in German 25 Jul 80 p 7 {Hans Ruehle article: "Schmidt Passed the Buck to America" ]

[Text ] When somebody takes a trip somewhere he usually has tales to tell. This is not true for the German chancellor after his return fran Moscow. His government statement, especially with respect to the field of the medium-range [missile] problem, was so sparse that not only the opposition had a hard time coming up with a detailed reply, but the Soviet Union too found itself forced to supply explanatory statements nearly day by day.

The more specific the Soviet Union became, the more modest was the rhetoric of the chancellor in this matter, And not only that, evur since DIE WELT publicized the minutes of the Moscow talks and thus shed light on questions of substance of the visit, it has also become obvious that Helmut Schmidt's report on the tone of the talks was plainly done up in his favor, Granted, as reported in the Bundestag, Schmidt lived up to his Venice mandate and spoke with the Soviets in no uncertain terms about Afghanistan, but then he came to feel what it means to negotiate with representatives of a world power which feels superior militarily and which believes in its political mission.


The uncompromising language of the Soviets in the negotiations and reliable reports on the feelings of the German delegation alone would have demanded an analysis of the only thing that could be sold as a success, at least after the publication of the minutes: the new offer of talks of mediumerange systems. Then it would have become obvious earlier that the new offer is in substance what the tone in which it was advanced was bound to camvey: a tall order.

The Conflict With Washington Is Programmed

Prior to the chancellor's trip to Moscow the potential landscape of negotiations in the field of nuclear medium-range systems was this:

In his East Berlin speech of 6 October 1979 party boss Brezhnev had declared his readiness to negotiate on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, provided no additional mediun- range U.S. weapons were stationed in Western Europe, meaning that the NATO decision on the closure of the arms gap not be adopted. Consequently, the Soviet Union reacted in the expected negative mammer to the NATO decision of 12 December 1979 which, apart from the intention to close tlie arms gap, contained an offer to the Soviet Union to neyvotiate on the ground-based nuclear medium-range systems. The Soviet Union demanded as a pre- condition for thc opening of corresponding negotiations the retraction, or at least the de facto suspension, of the decision to close the arms gap.

In the same speech Brezhnev tormulated the alternative hinted at several times earlier, namely to negotiate the whole problem of nuclear medium-range systems within the framework of SALT III. But the condition for this was the enactment of the SALT II treaty which U.S. President Carter shelved for the time being following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Besides, the Soviet Union had pointed out several times that in the event

of a round of negotiations by the big powers on the whole medium-range probl.m, the corresponding weapons systems of the alliance partners (especially France and Mgland) would have to be included,

It has been established in the meantime that the two offers continue to be valid in their specific forms, What has been added as a new offer is the Soviet propo al to negotiate in bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the nuclear medium-

range weapons of the two big powers with the inclusion of the so-called forward basei systems, meaning the forward based nuclear means of attack which the United States has, What will not be included in the talks, in contrast, are British, French and Chinese nuclear weapons, Agreements resulting from these bilateral talks, however, can be put into force only after the ratification of SALT II,

If we compare the old offers with the new proposal with respect to the negotiations and/or the course of talks, then it becomes evident that the procedure decisive element is inherent in the changed conditions, While the offers to date contained preconditions to be fulfilled essentially by European NATO states--the suspension of the decision on closing the arms gap in one case and the inclusion of the French and British nuclear weapons in SALT III negotiations in the other--the offer of bilateral talks which has been advanced, requiring the ratification of SALT II to be the first agreement, thus depends only on a precondition to be fulfilled exclusively by the United States,

By this trick the United States first of all is saddled with the responsibility for the implementation of NATO's decision on closing the arms gap which hitherto rested with the European NATO states (which has been noted in the United States, to be sure). But this is not all. in this manner the Schmidt government has succeeded in burdening the imple- mentation of the decision to close the arms gap with a precondition of which it must assume, in view of the current situation in the United States, that it just cannot be fulfilled. [paragraph cont inues ]


For the foreseeable future there will probably not be a majority in Congress for the ratification of SALT II, Hence the new offer is an almost definite guarantee that the disliked decision on closing the arms gap need not be implemented.

The positive assessment of the Soviet proposal by the German chancellor can be understood in the United States only in such a way that this involves a German-Soviet consensus for enforcing the ratification of SALT II or for hollowing out NATO's decision on closing

the arms gap. Viewed against this background it will probably be hard for U,S, politicians in the future--and the initial reactions illustrate this--to demand seriously and publicly the ratification of SALT II. Since the responsibility fo the implementation of the decision on closing the arms gap has been shifted in the manner shown, the next German- American conflict is probably already programmed, cCDU defense expert Manfred Woerner

ras pointed out that in the future the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic will jointly demand the ratification of SALT II in an “unholy alliance," And in the event that SALT

II is not ratified, the same “unholy alliance” will state that the implementation of the NATO decision on closing the arms gap is not possible because the United States has

failed to fulfill preconditions and, therefore, has ,revented the success of negotiations,

But it is :.re than uncertain whether the ratification of SALT Il will be the last obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty on the problem of muiclea: medium-range systems in Europe. Regardless of the fulfillment of this condition for the conclusion of the bilateral talks, the contents of these conditions have been so expanded by the inclusion of the U,S, forward based systems (FBS)--an inclusion which the chancellor received with “understanding” and termed “logical"--that a conclusion cannot be anticipated in view of the complicated matters involved,

To this day there has not even been a common definition of these systems between East and West. Opinions differ already on the roughest classification, While the Soviet Union includes among the U.5,' FBS airplanes carrying muclear weapons of the United States in Europe, nuclear weapons carrying planes aboard U,S, aircraft carriers in European waters and U.S, submarines carrying missiles subordinated to the European NATO Supreme Command, NATO rules the latter category out tctally, So far agreement has only been reached on one single characteristic definition feature: The systems mist be able to reach the Soviet Union directly--and in the case of planes they must be able to fly back to their own alliance territory,

But this is only where the problems begin, On the one hand, there are different ideas between East and West about the range of individual types of airplanes, But how should this question ever be solved without letting the Soviet Union either have all technical details about the airplanes in question or even such a plane for test purposes? And whet is more, if we take Western data as a basis, then U.S. carrier airplanes in the Med.terranean can reach the Soviet Union only if the carrier cruises in the eastern Mediterranean, The F-4 planes capable of carrying muclear weapons can reach Soviet terri- tory only from air bases in Italy, Greece and Turkey, Thus under the definition to date, the U.S. aircraft carrier planes would not be FBS if the carrier is not in the eastern Yediterranean, And consequently the F-4 would not be PBS if they are not stationed at air bases in the countries listed above,

If we proceed from the premise that any U.S. airplane with muclear weapons capability in Europe and even overseas can be ordered to Ivaly, Greece, or Turkey at comparatively short notice, a definition of the problem loses any reasonable dimension completely, meaning a dimension capable of negot' ation, Therefore it is not surprising that there is not a single Western expert right now who seriously advocates the view that the inclusion of

the FBS can be incorporated into acceptable negotiating positions even on a mediwua-term basis, let alone that it is possible to achieve an accord on this with the Soviet Union within the time schedule for the closure of the arms gap beginning in 1983,


Naturally the Soviet Union is aware of this as vell, the Soviet Union which has demanded the inclusion of the FBS in the SALT negotiations since 1969. For it now to propose the FBS for negotiations in primarily in order to fix for negotiating policy purposes the price wrought from Schmidt in Moscow for future talks, This means that now and in the future the FBS will be part of the Western negotiating substance without the Soviet Union having to enlarge the contents of its offer in the field of muclear medium-range weapons,

Beyond that the Soviet Union has concrete goals in negotiation policy which it pursues on a long-term basis--as always, When PRAVDA on 15 July points out in connection with the FBS discussion that the United States is capable of relocating mclear airplanes on short notice to places from which the Soviet Union could be attacked, then the primary goal of the Soviet Union becomes evident: a ban on specific West Ev~opean bases for use by U.S. miclear planes and thus in effect contro » r flight movements and deployment decisions in the NATO area,

The same applies to the problem of muclear planes aboard aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, In that respect it is the Soviet intention to achieve the banishment of U.S. planes from the eastern Mediterranean and thus not only to obtain a control right over U.S. ship movements, but also to accelerate the military destabilization of that region,

But this is not all, Finally 2nd above all the Soviet Union obviously feels that the creeping deterioration of the U.S.-European relationship might produce the chance for init‘ating Europe's nuclear separation via an isolation, reduction and finally elimination of toe U.S. nuclear attack potential in Europe, It is especially for this reason--but also for the sake of ensuring approval for its offers of talks by the parties not involved--that the Soviet Union has waived the demand for inclusion of the British and French nuclear weapons,

But why did the chancellor accep$ this offer in view of these problems? The answer is easy, Schmidt wanted negotiations--and the FBS were the price, There was no haggling over that. Thus the chancellor did not counter by calling for the inclusion of corresponding Soviet weapons systems,

In view of Schmidt's actions in Moscow, the Soviet Union may assume that in the ‘alks that have been offered all NATO miclear medium-range systems including the U.S. FBS will be on the negotiating table while the Soviet Union on its part need only contribute tie SS5-20, the old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and perhaps in addition the Backfire bomber,

This means that on NATO's part in effect the whole miclear attacking systeus which have

a penetrating depth of about 800 kilometers on are up for debate while the shole Soviet medium-range muclear bombers (450 Blinders and Badgers), parts of the Soviet Uniton!s tactical air forces with muiclear armament (200 Fencers), and the new "short-range missiles" SS-22--all of which have a penetration depth of 1,000 kilometers and thus can operate beyond the Rhine from the Soviet Union--are not counted, This is part of the lasting gift which Schmidt brought back from Moscow,

Granted, the people around him have been trying lately to remove the impression that the chancellor purposefully meant only the SS-20, the SS-4, SS-5 and the Backfire bomber

when he referred to “corresponding Soviet systems," Yet this is beyond any doubt, Besides, the Soviet Union would never have allowed any other interpretation of "corresponding systems" since Soviet FBS are currently non>xistent (all Soviet systems which can reach the United States have been subject to negotiation under SALT),

These considerations necessarily lead to a comparison of the mumerical »ases for the old and new negotiation proposals, [paragraph contimes]


No matter how the old starting base was computed, the superiority of the Soviet Union always amounted to more than the 572 additional systems demanded under the NATO decision, Hence the Soviet argument that the existirg power ratio must be upheld canalways be countered by the effective argument that this ratio is imbalanced to the disadvantage of the West.

This starting situation has drastically changed as a result of the new Soviet offer. Since the offer on both sides relates only to "medium-range missile weapons in Europe” (PRAVDA of 15 July 1980) and U.S. FBS, what now exists--projected to the year 1983, the year the arms gap closure begins--is a ratio of 650 eastern systems (200 SS-20, 450 SS-4, and SS-5) and at least 350 Western systems (160 Felll, 200 F-4 and/or carrier planes). Even now the Soviet Union ciaims that the number of U.S. FBS is near 500. Even though the West has always rejec’.ed this mode of counting and the criteria of definition on which it is based, one will realistically have no alternative but to have about 350 U.S. systems classified and counted as "BS,

This means no more nor less than that even in the event of the inclusion of the Backfire bombers, the West's requirements for closing the arms gap in this round cannot be get at more than 300 systems. The chancellor thus in effect cut the material part of the decision on the arms gap closure in half in Moscow, since nobody can seriously assume that the West European states could be persuaded to seek more than "parity" in the medium-range sector and engage in an “overarmament." Thus when one speaks of closing the arms gap in connection with the new offer of negotiations, it is at best 300 cystems and not 572 which will be at stake in the future.

But anyone who believes that Schmict allowed himself to he outsmarted in Moscow is wrong. The chancellor wanted negotiations at nearly any cost--and he got them. Meanwhile, he is not concerned that the envisaged talks will proceed from a starting basis which he has essentially worsened. The complicated matter of the FBS guarautees him the necessary beginning and signals to him a late--or even no--end to the negotiations. And as long as negotiations are underway, no closing of the arms gap is done.

Though this is being denied, and though it is being recalled at every opportunity that

the old schedule for the implementation of the decision on the closure of the arms gap will remain unchanged, that is to say that the deployment of the first systems will be started in late 1983, this is not even a good intention, because even the chancellor knows that none of the NATO states participating in the NATO decision will deploy new weapons systems of a special military and political quality if even a vague negotiating success

is in sight--or which is more probable, if the Soviet Union makes a modest concession but at the same time threatens to discontinue negotiations if the closure of the arms gap is begun, Hence a potential closure of the arms gap has been shifted to a remote distance,

It will be shown very soon that all other West European states share this assessment of the situation, Hence what people in the opposition assume will not happen: that the governments that had hitherto held a critical attitude toward the decision on closing

the arms gap will no longer approve of the material part of this decision, The opposite will be true. This has been clearly evident since the Bonn visit by Luxembourg Prime Minister Werner last week. In harmony and to a massive extent all West European states will in fulure demand the full implementation of the decision on closing the arms gap, being perfectly aware that the procedural preconditions and the inclusion of the FBS have created a negotiating situation which probably cannot be resolved in a positive manner in the foreseeable future.

It turned out on the occasion of the Bonn and Brussels visits by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher that the United States has indeed noticed the cuckoo!'s egg which

Schmidt dropped in its nest with the inclusion of the FBS, Obviously irritated, he let everybody know that the positive reception of the Soviet proposal on Schmidt's part is not at all to the liking of the United States. He stated at a press conference that the United States continues to be convinced "that in the course of the introductory talks one should concentrate on the ground-based, long-range Eurostrategic systems."



POLL SHOWS SCHMIDT IEADING GERMAN ELECTION RACE DW251045 Bonn DIE WELT in German 25 Jul 80 pl [Gottfriend Capell article: "Poll: Schmidt Cannot Be Beaten"]

[Text] Bonn--Mannheim political scientist Prof Rudolf Wildenmann is convinced that Chancellor Schmidt cannot be deprived of his election victory on 5 October, Schmidt

and therefore the SPD-FDP coalition, can hope for a maximum of 55 percent c.” the votes

as against a mere 42 percent for the CDU/CSU. Wildenmann!s survey for the lates edition of the economic journal CAPITAL showed a great lead for the government and the coalition, especially in political fields in which the CDU/CSU had been considered particularly trustworthy and competent up to now, Wildenmann!s survey dates back to April/May this year and covers 2,000 people interviewed, This circle of people has remained essentially unchanged for the past 5 years, so that in Wildenmann!s opinion the result clearly in- dicates any change in the development of opinion;in the FRG. In this connection the following can be considered sensational: 53 percent of those interviewed saw the SPD as "more likely to maintain a good relationship with the United States." Only 45 percent said so for the Union, The proportion was the reverse a year agao: SPD 41 percent, cDU/CSU 45 percent,

This development becomes even a bit plainer in the question on which party is more likely

"to guarantee security against a Russian attack": SPD 48, Union 41 percent, The 1976 figures were SPD 45, Union 51 percent, The question concerning the guaranteeing of price stability today is answered by 55 percent in favor of the SPD ani only 42 percent in favor of the DU/CSU. The situation 4 years ago was that the SPD received only 40 percent whereas the

CDU scored 54 percent. As for combating unemployment, 58 percent have more confidence in the SPD while 40 percent anticipate more from the Union,

This is strikingly at odds with the conviction